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For the whole sample, there is a statistically significant  more leveraged as the stock market develops, whereas
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Recent research in corporate finance has identified how  asymmetries of information and imnperfections  in
capital markets affect the firm's ability to raise funds and  invest. While empirical evidence suggests that
specific imperfections may significantly affect the firm's  financial and investment policies, there has been
little work on the effect of  the level of development of the  financial markets on the firnms  policies. In this
paper  we explore this  relationship by providing empirical  evidence on the association between  the
financing  choices of the firm and the level of development  of financial markets in thirty developed and
developing  economies for the period 1980-1991.
The finance literature suggests that stock markets serve important  functions even in those economies in
which there already exists a well developed banking  sector.  This is because equity and debt financing are
in general not perfect substitutes.  Equity financing has  a key role in managing the conflicts of interest that
may arise between different stakeholders in the firm. Stock markets also provide entrepreneurs with
liquidity  and for opportunities to diversifv their portfolios.  Stock trading transmits information about
firms, prospects to potential investors and creditors.'  As a result of the different attributes of debt and
equity, the development of markets that facilitate the issuance and trading in equity should be reflected in
the financing decisions of individual firms.
While differences in financial systems have been noted  in the literature, there have been few attempts to
formally  model the effects of financial market development  on firms' financing choices or on their
investrnent decisions. Notable exceptions are Pagano  (1993) model of  the effect of opportunities for
diversification  on entrepreneurs' portfolio choices,  Bencivenga  et al.'s  (1994) analysis of financial
'Allen  (1993) contrasts the comparative advantages of stock markets  and financial institutions in processing
information about investment protects.
3liquidity on technology choice, and Boyd and Smith's (1995)  framework analyzing complementarities of
debt and equity financing for capital investments.  The empirical work in this area is also sparse. There are
empirical studies of firm debt-equity ratios  by Titnan  and Wessels (1988) for the U.S., R?flan  and
Zingales (1994) for a sample of developed countries,  and Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic (1994) for a
sample of developing countries. Also, Mayer (1989) and  Singh et al. (1992) have looked z  corporate
financing patters in develored and developing countries.  respectively.
This is  the first paper that empirically explores the effect  of financial market developmen;. particularly
stock market development on firm financing choices.  We compare the relationship between capital
structure choice and financial market development in a sample  of thirty developed and developing
countries.  We investigate the extent to which the variation  in the aggregate debt-equity ratios within these
countries can be explained by (a) the level of development  of  the country's financial marikets,  (b)
macroeconomic factors, sucii as the growth rate and the rate of inflation, (c) the differences between the tax
treatment of debt and equirt' securities and (d) the firm-specific  factors that have been idenified in the
corporate finance literature as determining financial st-ucture.
We find that in general there is a significant positive relationship  between bank development  and leverage
and a negative but insignifcant relationship between  stock market development and leveraae.  However,
when we break the full sample down into sub-samples  and control for the other determinams  of firm
financing an interesting reLzrionship  between leverage and  stock market development emer-es. In already
developed stock markets, farther development  leads to a substitution of equity for debt firumcing.  By
contrast, in developing stock markets. large firms become  more levered as the stock marke: develops,
whereas the smallest firms do not appear to be significantly  affected by market development.
Our results have important implications. In many developing  countries with emerging stock markets banks
are fearful of stock market development, that stock markets  will reduce the volume of  their business.
Instead, our results imply that initial improvements in the functioning  of a developing stock market
4produce  a higher debt equity ratio for firms, and thus more business for banks. These results also suggest
that in countries with developing financial systems stock  markets and banks play different, yet
complementary roles.  Thus, policies undertaken to develop  stock markets need not affect existing banking
systems adversely.  Our results are also consistent with the conclusion of  Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(1995) that stock market and financial intermediary development  proceed simultaneously.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The predicted  relationship between financial market
development and debt-equity ratios is discussed in Section  2. The sample of countries is discussed and the
data sources are described in Section 3. The statistical model  is described in Section 4 and the results are
reported  in Section 5. The conclusions are stated in Section  6.
2. Framework  for Analysis
Corporate  finance theory suggests that corporations optimally  structure financing packages to reduce the
economic  costs thar result from taxes and from imperfections  in the financial markets. As financial markets
develop, the comparative significance of different imperfections  is likely to change. As a consequence, the
issuance of specific securities may become more or less advantageous  for certain categories of firms. Thus,
there may be a relationship between financial market development  and financing choices.2
In this section we consider three classes of  imperfections  that may result from inadequately developed
financial markets. First, insufficient opportunities for diversification  of portfolios by investors and
entrepreneurs.  Second, the inability to enter into financing  contracts appropriate for the firm's investment
projects. Third, the asymmetries of information between  investors  and the firm that occur because stock
2 In this section we  focus  on equity  market  development,  in part because it has been  most evident  during  our period  of
analysis  (for a discussion,  see  Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine (1995)). However.  it is important  to bear  in mind  that
there are important  spillovers  between  development  of the equitv market  and development  of the banking  system.
5markets do not efficiently aggregate information. For each of these imperfections we identify the effect of
financial market development on the fimns' financing  choices.
Diversification by entrepreneurs and stock market liquidity
In an economy in which equity markets are imperfec,  entrepreneurs  face costs of diversifying their
portfolios. Outside investors may require a premiun  to acquire the stock of firm that is traded on an illiquid
market. Moreover, as Pagano (1993) has emphasized,  the benefits to the entrepreneur of exchanging the
ownership of a stake of his or her firm for a portfolio  of financial assets may be limited if the financial
market on which these assets are traded does not provide  opportunities for diversification. The costs of
diversification may induce the entrepreneur to avoid  the use of financial markets and, instead, to alter the
firm's investment and product decisions so as to optimally  balance his or her personal portfolio. 3
There are several ways in which the firm's investment  policies may be affected by the owners' inability to
diversify optimally in financial markets. First, the firm  may diversify into areas in which it does not have a
compararive advantage. Second. the firm may invest  less than it would if its shares were widely held.
Third, it may choose less capital intensive production  technologies  that are subject to less long-term risk.
Optimal contracting andfinancial markets
There exist conflicts of interest between the firm and  its customers and suppliers and between different
classes of investors in the firm. These conflicts mav  induce the firm's owners. or managers who represent
them, to harm the interests of the other parries. Because  such opportunistic behavior can be anticipated, it
may make it more difficult for the firm to obtain financing.  However, by optimal  structuring of  the
This argument  parallels  the more  familiar  argument  in finance that the firm's financial  policies  are chosen  so as to
take advantage  of tax shields  which  the owners'  cannot exploit on their personal  accounts.  Here,  the argument  is that
the firm's investment  policy  may  be chosen  to achieve a risk-return trade-off  that  owners'  cannot  obtain  by altering
their portfolio  investments.
6contracts between the fim  and outside investors, the owners'  incentives to engage in opportunistic
behavior can be mitigated. 4
The corporate finance literature has identified several cases in which reliance on outside debt financing
increases the incentives of the firm's owners to act opporrunistically  or to otherwise harm the creditors,
customers and suppliers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that highly levered firms may have an
incentive to take on projects that have negative expected net present values and are risky, thereby harming
creditors. Myers (1977) shows that firms with significant  risky growth opportunities may forgo profitable
projects if the resulting increases in value are captured  by the firms creditors. Titnan  (1984) argues that as
high leverage increases the probability of financial  distress sufficiently,  the firm will enter into contracts
that it may be unable to execute. Maksimovic (1988) and Maksimovic  and Titmian  (1991) argue that
leverage increases the firm's incentive to renege on value enhancing  implicit contracts with rival firms or
with customers.
Because debt financing creates incentives to act opportunistically,  a highly levered firm may not be able to
obtain credit or to exploit fully opportunities for mutually beneficial  contracting with customers, rivals or
suppliers. In these cases, issuance of equity would mitigate the incentive problems created by debt
financing.
Equity  markets and information aggregation
In addition to their primary role of supplying capital to the economy,  equity markets have an important
informational role. Equity markets aggregate information  about the prospects of the firms whose shares are
traded (Grossman (1976)). This aggregated information  becomes  publicly observable by the firm's
There  is a large  literature  on conflicts  of interest between different classes  of investors.  The  important  references  are
Jensen  and Meckling  (1976), Myers  (1977)  and Myers and Majluf (1984).  For an overview  see  Bamea,  Haugen  and
Senbet  (1985)  and Harris  and Raviv  (1991).
7creditors and investors. Markets thereby facilitate the monitoring  of the firm bv  making it more profitable
for them to contribute capital to the firM. 5
In addition to aggregating information, financial markets  provide incentives for information acquisition by
investors. As markets for publicly traded equity increase  in size, it becomes profitable for analysts to invest
in acquiring information about firmns. 6 The resulting  increase in the quality of information further
facilitates monitoring by creditors.
The effect of developing an equity market
To fix ideas,  consider an entrepreneurial firm operating  in an environment without a functioning equity
market.  The firm is financed by inside equirvy  trade  credit and bank borrowing. Because we are assuming
that there does not exist an effective equity market, the  firmns initial debt-equity ratio will not be an
economic optimum. Hence, once the market is opened  we would expect the firm's owners to move away
from the initial debt-equity ratio.
The initially limited access to equity markets suggests that such a  firm is likely to have a sub-optimally
high debt-equity ratio for its scale of operations.  A possible  secondary implication of limited access is that
the firm may be suboptimally small: it may pass up growth  opportunities which would be exploited if there
existed a functioning equity market. This mav occur  for the reasons identified above. First, because
expansion can only be financed using the entrepreneur's  own capital or debt, investment in risky growth
opportunities may increase the risks borne by the undiversified  entrepreneur enough to make it
unattractive.  Second, certain projects are optimally financed  with equity capital. Such projects mav not be
profitable if financed by debt. Third, in the absence of a public market aggregating information,
informational asymmetries  may make it too costly to raise capital from outside investors.
This role of financial  markets  is sufficiently  important  that many investment  funds  and mutual  funds  are prohibited
from investing  in companies  whose  stock  does not trade on a rccognized  exchange.
6 For a formal  model,  see  Grossman  and Stiglitz  (1980).
8Now allow an equity market  to begin functioning.  There will be three direct  effects of the firm's debt-
equity  ratio: first,  a substitution  effect as outside equitv is substituted  for outside  debt  by firms  that had
previously  been constrained  to issue  only  outside debt. This effect  will decrease  the firm s debt-equity
ratio. Second,  outside  equity  will be substituted  for inside equity. This will not affect  the firnms  debt-equity
ratio. Third, the entrepreneur's  ability  to diversify risks may make expansion  more  attractive.  The effect
of such expansion  on the firm's debt-equity  ratio is ambiguous and will depend  on the optimal  financial
structure  of the firm.
The development  of an equity  market  may also have an indirect effect on the firm's leverage.  Equity
markets  aggregate  information  investors  possess about firms. This  makes it less  costly  for inrvestors  and
financial  intermediaries  to monitor  firms.  Thus, exLernal  equity and debt should become  less  risky. We
would  therefore  expect  to see an increase  in external financing.  It is, however,  unclear  whether  extemal
equity  or debt would  benefit  more.  To the extent that debt is provided by the product  mark:: and  by banks,
who are probably  already  well informed,  we would expect  to see a decrease  in leverage  as fnancial
markets  reduce  the costs of monitoring  to investors.
AUl  of the above arguments  are conditioned  on the hypothesis  that equity  markets  develop  relative  to the
market  for debt. If the debt market  develops  faster. then the effects may be reversed.
The  net effect  of above considerations  is that the effect of equity market  development  on the debt-equity
ratio is ambiguous.  The question  is investigated  empirically  below.
93. Description  of Sample  and Financial  Market
Indicators
Our sample consists of thirty developed and developing  economies for the period 1980-91.7 These
economies were selected because they have a developed  or emerging stock marker and because data on
individual firms' financial suuctures is available for a sufficiently  large number of firms. 8
Table I lists all the countries in the sample, together with several  indicators of economic development of
each country. As an inspection  of the table reveals, the sarnple represents a wide range of economic
development: the GDP per czpita for 1991 ranges from  $27,492  for Switzerland to S359  for Pakistan. With
the exception of South Africa and Jordan, all the economies  have experienced growth in per capita income
during the sample period.  Some economies, especially  Brazil, Mexico and Turkev, have experienced high
rates of inflation in this peiod.
Insert  Table  1 here
In the absence of a theory of  financial market development,  we use empirical indicators to measure the
level of development of the equity market and financial  intermediaries  in each country for each vear of the
sample. Our first three stock market indicators are the ratio  of stock market capitalization  to GDP
(MCAP/GDP), the ratio of tocal volume of shares traded  to GDP (TVT/GDP) and the ratio of  the total
value of shares traded to market capitalization  (TOR). In our sample MCAP, TVT. TOR are drawn from
IFC's emerging market data ;-ase.
Our indicators of stock market development have been used in previous studies, (e.g., Pagano (1993),
'Tle  economies  in the sample =e  Austria,  Australia,  Belgium, Brazil, Canada,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Hong
Kong, India, Italy, Japan. Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico.  Netherlands,  New Zealand. Norway, Pakistn,
Singaporc,  South Africa,  Spf=, Sweden,  Switzerland,  Thailand, Turkey, United  Kingdom,  United  States,
Zimbabwe.
To the best of our knowledge. te  sample incorporates all the firm level financial data for developing countries
currently available to researcuers.
10Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1995)) and provide intuitive  summary  statistics for the level of activity of the
stock market and the significance of that activity for each  of the economies in the sample. MCAP!GDP is
measure  of both the stock market's ability to allocate capital to investmnent  projects and to provide
significant  opportunities for risk diversification for investors.  TVT/GDP and TOR are indicators of market
liquidity.  The former measures the ability to trade economically  significant positions on the stock market,
whereas the latter is indicator of liquidity of assets traded  on the market, not adjusted for the size of the
market relative to the economy.  We also combine  the three  indicators in an equally weighted index of
market development (INDEXI).  Table 2 lists the 1980-91  averages  for the stock market development
indicators  for each economy.
9
In ten of the economies the financial markets are classified  as "emerging" by the Intemational Finance
Corporation.10 These are Brazil. India, Jordan. Korea, Malaysia,  Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and
Zimbabwe.  Interestineg-. several emerging markets,  such  as Malaysia, Korea and Thailand have higher
MCAP/GDP ratios than some developed economies, such  as Canada,  Germany and France. The
correlation  between MCAP/GDP and the GDP per capital  is only 0.23. Similarly, the TVT/GDP and TOR
ratios are only weakly correlated  with GDP (correlation  coefficients  of 0.23 and 0.34, respectively).
Insert  Table 2 here
The principal indicators we use are measures of activity,  rather  than measures of the institutional
determinants of conditions under which securities are traded.  This is in part aue to the difficulty in
quantifying  differences in, say, the regulatory environment  that may affect  irms'  decisions to issue equity
or debt in the United States and Great Britain. However,  differences  in the institutions among the ten
9 The  indicators  in columns  headed  by INST and INDEX2 are discussed below.
'  IFC  Factbook.
11emerging markets are large enough to be quantified.  Several  imnportant  institutional indicators in the
emerging markets. drawn from various editions of IFC's  Factbook, are detailed in Table 3.
Insert  Table  3 here
As shown in the table, bv the end of our sample period  the  institutions in Brazil, Mexico. Malaysia and
Korea were more developed than those of, for example,  Zimbabwe. The principal differences resulted from
lower restrictions on dividend and capital repatriation  and  in higher quality of firm disclosures in the
former group. An arithmetic average of the ini  onal  indicators for emerging markets is listed in the
INST  column of Table 2.
For the same emerging markets we also report INDEXI  augmented by Korajczyk's indicator  of securities
mispricing  (Korajczyk (1994)). This indicator measures  the extent of mispricing of securities relative to a
domestic CAPM for each countrv and is an indicator  of extent of market efficiency." The augmented index
is reported as INDEX2 in Table 2.
We use three empirical indicators to measure the siznificance  of the banking sector in each of the
economies in our sample. Each indicator quantifies  different  components of banks' provision of funds to
the private sector in each of the economies. M3/GDP  measures  the ratio of banks' liquid liabilities (M3) to
GDP. It is an indicator  of the size of the banking  sector to the economy as a whole and has been used in
several studies of the effect of the financial sector on the growth in the economy.' 2 Our second indicator is
the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to the  GDP. PRIV!GDP. This ratio measures the role of
banks on the provision of longer term financing to privare  corporations. A third indicator is the ratio of
" The indicator  is similar  to the indicator  estimated  in Korajczyk  and Viallet  (1989)  and is described  in that  paper and
Korajczyk  (1995).  We  also used  mispricing  indicarors  obtained from international  CAPM  and AFr models,
however  these  are  not reported  since  the results are not significantly  different
12 Studies  that  have  used  this indicator  include  King and Levine. (1993),  Levine  and Renelt  (1992)  and Levine  and
Zervos  (1994).
12deposit bank domestic assets to GDP, BANK/GDP.  M3/GDP and PRIV/GDP are averaged to yield
FINDEXI.  The data on M3, PRIV, BANK and GDP are drawn from Intemational Financial Statistics,
published by the International Monetary Fund.
Whereas in many developing countries banks are the onlv significant financial intermediaries, in developed
economies there also exist significant insurance companies,  pension funds and other intermediaries. To
gauge the importance of financial intermediaries in general  on provision of credit we also take the rario of
assets held by deposit banks, non-bank private fmancial  assets and assets of private insurance and pension
companies to GDP (FINDEX 2).
Insert  Table 4 here
Data on individual firms in Korea, India, Mexico, Jordan.  BraziL Turkey, Pakistan and Zimbabwe come
from the  EFC's  corporate finance database. It consists  of financial data on the hundred largest firms  rading
on the stock exchanges of these countries. For some markets the data is only available for a sub-period, as
noted in Table 1 in the Appendix. Data on firms in the remaining  countries in Table I comes from Global
Vantage database. The number of firms available for the  Global Vantage sample is also noted in Table 1 in
the Appendix.
Insert  Table  5 here
Research in the United States shows that financial policies  are in part determined bv firm size. There are
economies of scale in issuing securities (Ritter (1987)).  Larger firms may have more access to financial
markets and be followed by a larger number of analvsts.  To aid in the interpretation of the results, Table 5
provides information on the size distribution oi firms  in each market. In each market, firms were ranked
13according to the average size, measured by total assets.  over the sample period. The average of each
quartile of firm size is reported in the mable.
As revealed by inspection of  Table 5, firm sizes  differ materially across economies. The average asset
value of the largest quartile of Italian firms is approximately  $4.5 billion, whereas it is approximately $65m
in Thailand and Zimbabwe. The differences are equally  marked  in the smallest quartile: the average fim  in
the lowest quartile in Sweden is seventy seven times larger than the average fim  in the same quartile in the
Thailand.
Equally significant, there are major differences  in firm size within each country. In fourteer of the markets,
the average firm in the smallest quartile has assets under $1 Om. In some countries  the diffemences  in size
between the largest and smallest firms are very large.  Thus, in Belgium the average firm in the largest
quartile is approximately three hundred times larger than the average firm in the smallest quartile. The
large differences in firm sizes in the sample suggest that the development of markets may have different
effects on large and small firms in the same market
4. Determinants  of Financial Structure
In order to isolate the contribution of financial market  development  on the firm's choice of  inancial
structure we control for other variables that may  affect the firm's  financing choices. We conrol for three
categories of  variables: individual firm characteristics.  the tax levels in each of the economies in our
sample and macroeconomic-factors.
As discussed above, the firn's  optimal financing mix will depend on the owners' ability to engage in
opportunistic behavior at the expense of creditors  and other parties. This, in turn will in par: depend on the
composition of the firm's assets. We control for asset  composition  by measuring  the firm's net fixed assets
14to total assets (NFATA) and net sales to net fixed assets  (NSNFA). Firms with high NFATA and low
NSNFA are predicted to have high long-term and short-term  leverage respectively.'3
We use two variables as proxies the finns  requirement  for debt financing: the ratio of earnings to total
assets (PROFIT) and the ratio of dividends to total assets  (DIVTA). PROFIT is included because several
studies have found an inverse relationship between profitability  and leverage. The DIVTA variable is
included because cash-constrained firms are unlikely to pay out large dividends.
Our last two firm characteristics measure the firms non-debt  tax shields (NDTS) and its size relative to the
economy (TA/GDP). All other factors being equaL a firm with significant non-debt tax shields is less able
to exploit tax shields obtained from debt financing than a finm with smaller insignificant non-debt tax
shields. TA/GDP is included as a measure of the firmrs  access to the financial markets.  The sample means
for each of these variable for each country is reported in Table 6.
Insert  Table  6 here
The firm's choice of debt level will depend on part on the tax-treatment  of interest income relative to
income derived from dividends and capital gains. For each  economy and each year we have calculated the
relative tax advantage of debt and equity using darm  drawn  from the annual editions of Coopers & Lybrand,
International Tax Summaries during our sample perioL  This data is reported in Table 2 of the Appendix.
Finally, we also control for two macro-economic variables:  the inflation rate (INFL) and the growth rate of
the GDP (GROWTH). Because debt contracts are typically  written in nominal dollars, the rate of inflation
may affect the riskiness, in real terms, of debt financing.  Growth is included as a measure of the growth
opportunities available to firms in the economv. Finance theory suggests that growth options should not be
13 For a more  comprehensive  discussion  of the relationship  between leverage  and firm  specific  characteristics  see
Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1994).
15financed  by debt. Thus, we would expect debt financing  to be inversely related to GROWTH.
Our control model for financial strucmure  is
y;,_EP0,,\-E  y_-+  SElf
where y is a measure of leverage, x are the firm specific  characteristics (NFATA, PROFIT, NSNFA,
NDTS,  DIVTA,TA/GDP), m are the macro-economic  factors (GROWTH. INFL), t are die tax variables
and d are the time and country dummies. Below, this  equation  is augmented by financial institution and
stock market indicators.
5 Results
In this section we present our analysis of the effects of financial market development on firms' financing
choices. First, we discuss the correlations between firms'  capital  structures and indicators of  financial
market development. Second, we characterize the relationship  between financial structures and  financial
market indicators in developing and developed financial  markets when  determinants of firms' capital
structres  identified in the corporate finance literature  are taken into account.
Simple correlations
Our primary focus is on the effect of financial market  development on the use of equity and debt financing
in each of the economies under consideration. To this  end, we use the average ratio of debt to equity  in
each economy in each year as the dependent variable.
14 Specifically,  for each economy, .or each year,
"By using  aggregated  data  we  avoid  problems  posed for empirical testing by the observed  heterogeneity  of capital
structures  adopted  by seemingly  identical  firms (Myers (1984)). Such heterogeneity  is predicted  aut  theories  that
focus on macro-economic  (Miller  (1977))  or industry-level  (Maksimovic  and Zechner  (1991))  determinants  of
financial  structure.
16we calculate the average ratio of short-term debt to total  equity for the fums in our sample (STDTE),  long-
term to total equitv (LTDTE) end total debt to total equity (TDTE). The simple correlations of LTDTE,
STDTE and TDTE for each country and each year  with each other  and with indicators of stock market
and financial institution development are shown in Table 7.
As  revealed in the table, the use of short-term and long-term  debt by finns in an economy is positively
correlated.  LTDTE is  negatively  correlated with the size of the stock market (MCAP/GDP),  positively
correlated with the size of the banking sector (BANK/GDP)  and positively correlated  with the real per
capita income (GDP/CAP).  The  results for STDTE are similar.  Thus, a large stock market is associated
with reductions in both long-term and short-term debt financing.  Interestingly, the level of activity of the
stock market (as measured bv TOR or TVT/GDP) is not  correlated with LTDTE or STDTE. This suggests
that an active secondary market for stocks is not a first  order determinant of flrms  financing choices.
Similarly, the M3/GDP, which has been used as a measure  of the  size of the banking sector is not
correlated with financing choices of firms.
Inserr  Table 7 here
Financial market developmem as a determinant offirm  capital structure
While the simple correlations between debt and the level of the stock market and the banking sector
suggest that equity is a substinue for both short-term and  long-term  debt financing, they do not take into
account other determinants of firms' financing choices identified  in the previous section. Thus, for
example, the observed correlarions  may be the result of differences  in industry composition, in tax regimes
and growth rates and macro-factors. To investigate these issues further we perform an OLS regression of
the firms' financing variable cn firm characteristics (NFATA,  PROFIT, NSNFA, NIDTS, DIVTA,
TA/GDP),  macro-economic factors (GROWTH, INFL), tax variables, time and country dummies as well
as financial intermediary and srock market indicators. By controlling  for the determinants identified in the
17literature,  this regression  is a more  conservative  test of the  relationship  between  financing  choices  and
market development  indic=tors  than the simple correlations reported above.  Furthermore,  it is likely  that
some of the time  and country  dummies  may be picking up  unmeasured  differences  in financial  markets
between  countries  and over  time.
Table 8 reports  R  of each  regression  and the significance levels of the F-tests  testing  the joint hvpothesis
that coefficients  of specific  groups  of determinants  firms  financing  choices  are  zero.
Insert  Tabke 8 here
As reported in table,  this  specification  explains  approximately eighty  percent  of  the variation  in STDTE,
LTDTE  and TDTE. Among  the newly added control variables, firm characteristics  and country dummies
have highly significant  explanatory  power. This is consistnt  with the results  of firm level regressions  in
Demirguc-Kunt  and  Maksimovic  (1994),  where these variables are discussed  in detail. Consistent  with
corporate  finance  theory,  mx  variables  are significant  in the LTDTE regression.  Macro  variables,  growth
and inflation,  jointly  have  a negative  and significant  effect on short-term  debt  and  total  debt  but not on long
term debt. Growth  variab.e  itself  has a negative  and significant sign in all thre equations,  indicating  that
debt financing  is indeed  inversely  related  to growth  as predicted by theory.
Turning to the variables  of primary  interest,  as before, BANK/GDP is positiveil  related  to firms' debt
levels.  As shown  in the table,  this relationship  is significant at the 5% level in  the case of long  term  debt
and 10% in the case  of short  term debt. A stronger  association with long-term  debt  is expected  because
financial intermediaries  are likely  to have a comparative  advantage in making  long-term  loans,  whereas
short term financing  may  ie available  through trade credit.
The stock market  indicator  INDEX  I is negative  but is not significant in these  regressions.  This  indicates
that the a simple variable  measuring  the development  of the market  does not help  explain  firms' choices
18of financial structure  once  the development  of the banking sector and the other  control  variables  are taken
into account.
We have explored  this  finding  in unreported  regressions. It is robust for alternative  specifications  of stock
market and financial  intermediary  indicators.  Thus, alternative stock indicators,  such  as MCAP/GDP,
TVT/GDP  and TOR,  in conjunction  with each of the fmancial intermediary  indicators  M3/GDP,
FINDEX  I and FINDEX2  consistently  yield negative, but insignificant coefficients  for the stock market
indicator in equations  explaining  STD/TE,  LTD/TE  and TD/TE. This  pattern  suggests  that  there  does exist
a relationship  between  firm  financing  choices  but that this pattern may not be captured  with  the simple
linear specification.  We next explore  this finding  further, and attempt  to characterize  more  fully  the
interactions between  stock  market  development  and financing choices.
Stock market development andfirm capital structure:  developed  vs. developing markets
Pagano (1993) and others  argue  that  stock markets  may play different roles  in financing  enterprises  in
economies  where  they  are small  and in economies  where they are well developed.  To investigate  the
possibility  that  stock  markets  may  have  different  effects on firms' financing  choices  as the level  of market
development  varies.  we split  the sample  into sub-samples and estimate  the effect  of stock  market
development  separately  in each.  We use INDEX1 scores to split the sample  into  those markets  which  are
"developed"  markets  and those  which  are "developing"  markets. Top 15  markets  in Table  2 are classified
as "developed,"  and the remaining  markets  are classified as "developing."
Consistent  with  the findings  of Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine (1995), in this split  well-developed  stock
markets  of developing  countries  such as Korea,  Malaysia and Thailand  belong  to the developed  group,
whereas the relatively  underdeveloped  markets  in some European countries,  such  as in Austria,  Italy and
Finland  fall into the "developing"  category. This grouping is superior to a split  based  on developed  vs.
developing  countries,  since  it takes  into account  the fact that some markets  classified  as emerging  may
19already have a significant role in the financing of their  national  private corporate sector as the established
markets in developed countries. The average MCkP.'GDP  in the two sub-samples over the sample period
is shown in Figure 1. The difference among the two  zroups  is evident and appears to be constant through
time.
We examine the effect of stock market development  on firm financing in the developing and developed
market sub-samples separately. Table 9 shows the  coefficients  of the stock market development indicator
in our equation explaining firms' choice of STDTE,  LTDTE  and TDTE in the two sub-samples. As
financial variables, the basic equation was estimated  separately  on each sub-sample  with one indicator for
stock market development (MCAP/GDP, TVT/GDP,  TOR, INDEX1 and INDEX2) and one indicator for
the development of the financial intermediary sector  (M3/GDP, BANK/GDP, FINDEXI and FINDEX2).
Insert Tabke 9 here
Inspection  of Table  9 shows  an interesting  conutast  between the "developed"  market  and "developing"
market sub-samples. The coefficients of the stock market  indicator in the developed market subsample are
uniformly negative, whereas the coefficients in the  developing  market subsample are all positve with one
exception. 15 These patterns suggest that in economies  with more developed stock markets, further
development of the market leads  to a substitution of  equity  financing for debt financing. This is seen most
clearly in  the case of long-term  debt,  where  the coefficients are predominantly  statistically  significant By
contrast, in those economies in which the stock market  is developing, further development of the market
leads to opportunities for risk sharing and for aggegation  of information that allow firms to increase their
borrowing.
'M  The probabilities of these patterns occurring  bv  chance  are Q.512  and 9x0.5 1 2 respectively. That is the
probability  that  all  the coefficients  of the LTD,  STl) and TD equations  for all the four  stock  market  indicators  for which
we have  data indeveloping  and  developed  markets  take the value  they do if there  is no  relationship  and  the regression is
constructed  from independent  draws  from a data distnbution. Because  for each  stock  market  indicator  and each equation
we have estimated  four  relationships  using different financial institutions  indicators,  we only cournt  the sign once per
specification.
20Differences between large vs. small firms
It is likely that the effect  of stock  market  development  may be different  for large  and small  firms. In
particular,  the information  aggregation  role of the market is likely to be more  significant  for large  firms
that trade often and are followed  by many analysts. To test this hypothesis, we formed  portfolios
consisting  of the largest  and smallest  quartiles  of fims  in each country  based  on their  asset size.  Our basic
regression  equation  was  then estimated  on four sub-samples: the largest  quartile  of firms  in  developed  and
developing  stock  markets  and  the smallest  quartile of frms in the developed  and developing  stock markets.
Insert  Table 10 here
Table 10 reports  the results  of the splits according to size. The coefficients  of the stock  market  variable for
large firms in the developed  stock  markets  sample are uniformly negative  and for  LTDTE  statistically
significant  at the 5% level  when  MCAP/GDP is used as an indicator  of market  development.  By contrast,
the coefficients  of  the stock  market  variable for large firms in the developing  stock  markets  sample are
uniformly  positive  and  for the most  part statistically significant at the 5% for STDTE,  LTDTE  and TDTE.6
These findings  suggest  that  for large  firms in developed stock markets,  further  market  development  acts to
enhance  opportunities  for  substitution  of equity for debt financing. By contrast,  large  firms in developing
stock markets  take advantage  of further  development  to increase  their borrowing.
The coefficients  of the stock  market  indicator  for small firms in developed  stock  markets  are negative.  This
accords  with the results  for large  firms in the same markets and suggests that  small  firms  are also  taking
advantage  of market  development  by substituting  debt for equity financing.  Interestingly,  the coefficients
16  The probability  of these  patterns  of signs occurring  by chance are 0.5' for the developed  markets  sample
and 0.59  for the developing  markets  sample.
21of small firms in  developing  markets  are also  predominantly negative,  although  not statistically
significant.'7
To place these  results  in context,  Table 11 presents  F-tests of the joint hypothesis  that certain  categories  of
coefficients  are zero  estimating  a basic regression  on each of the sub-samples.  In these  regressions  the
stock market  development  indicator  is INDEXI and the financial intermediary  development  indicator  is
BANK/GDP.  Panel  I shows  the split between  developed and  developing  markets. As inspection  of the
stock market  indicator  column  reveals,  stock market development,  as measured  by INDEX  1, most
significantly  affects  the financing  choices of firms in developed markets. Stock  market  development
induces  firms in these  markets  to substitute  equity  for debt. The corresponding  results for developing
markets are not significant  In Panel  II we further  analyze the largest  and smallest  quartiles  of firms  in each
market and see that stock  market  development  significantly affects  the financing  choices  of large  firms  in
developing  markets,  inducing  them  to increase  their leverage. Inspection  of Panel  II also  reveals  that  we
are better able  to explain  financial  structures  of large firms than small  firms in all markets.
Insert Table  11 here
To obtain  a visual  representation  of the interaction  between financing  choices  and stock  market
development,  following  Barro  (1991) we subtract  from the dependent  variables  of the first  two regressions
reported in Panel  II of Table 11  (LTDTE  and STDTE), all the dependent  variables  multiplied  by their
estimated coefficients  with  the exception  of the stock market indicator.  For the two  subsamples  of
developed  and developing  markets,  Figure  2 shows  the unexplained  residuals  of STDITE  and LTDITE
plotted against  INDEX  1  at the sample  means of each variable during the sample  period  for each economy.
'7  The probability  of this pattem of signs  occurring by chance in the developed  markets  sample  is 0.59. The
probability  of obtaining  seven or more negative coefficients in the nine equations  of the developing  markets
sample in the absence  of a relationship  is 45xO.5 9. The probability  is obtained  using the Binomial  formula
0.59x(l+9!18!+9!/(7!2!)).
2_The visual evidence is striking. It suggests that for economies  with developing stock markets debt-equity
ratios of large firms increase with the development of the stock market.  For large firms in economies with
more developed markets, further development is associated  with lower debt to equity ratios.
Taken together, the results suggest  that further development  of stock markets may affect firms differently
in economies where the markets already play a significant  role than in those where thev do not. If stock
markets are already significant, further development  leads to a substitution of equity financing for debt.
However, in economies where stock markets are too small to have a significant role in the economy, as
measured by our indicators, development permits large firms to increase their leverage.
6. Conclusion
This is the first paper in literature  that empiricallv explores  the effect of financial market development,
particularly stock market development, on firm financing  choices.  We use aggregated firm level data for a
sample of thirty countries for the period 1980-91.  We measure  stock market development  by the ratio of
market capitalization to gross domestic product, total value traded to gross domestic product and the annual
turnover ratio.
Taking all the countries in the sample together, we find that there is a statistically signficant negative
correlation  between stock market development, as measured  by market capitalization to gross domestic
product, and the ratios of both long-term and short-term  debt to total equity of firms. There is also a
statistically significant  positive relationship  between the size of the banking sector and leverage.
Interestingly, there is no correlation between the level  of activity  of a stock market, as measured bv the
turnover ratio or the ratio of total value traded to GDP, and  firm leverage.
The negative linear relationship between leverage and stock market development loses  statistical
significance when we control for variables that have been identified  in the corporate fmance literature as
23determining  firms'  financial  structures.  However,  when we break the full sample  down into  sub-samples  an
interesting  pattern  emerges.  In developed  markets,  further development  leads  to a substituion of equity  for
debt financing,  especiallv  for long  term debt. In developing markets,  large firms  become  more  levered  as
the stock market  develops,  whereas  the smallest  firms do not appear to be significantly  affected  by market
development
These findings  suggest  tat  the development  of a stock market initially  affects  directly  the financial
policies of only  the largest  firms. This  may be because diversification  of ownership  and the aggregation  of
information  provided  by  the development  of stock markets initially  benefits  the larger  firms  more, due to
the need to spread  fixed  issuance  costs  and traders' costs of information  acquisition. Moreover,  these
finms  increase  leverage.  Thus,  initially  at least,  an important role of the stock  market  is to  aggregate
information  and thereby  induce  lenders  to extend credit to firms whose stock  is traded.
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26Table 1.  Economic Development Indicators
GDP/CAP  Growth 80-91  Inflation  80-91  Life expectancy
(US  S)  (percent)  (percent)  (years)
Switzerand  27,492  1.7  3.8  78
Japan  23,584  3.9  1.5  79
Norway  19,664  1.7  5.2  77
Sweden  19,649  1.6  7.4  78
United States  18,972  1.9  4.2  76
Finland  18,046  1.6  6.6  76
France  17,365  1.8  5.7  77
Austria  17,288  2.2  3.6  76
Netherlands  16,479  2.3  1.8  77
Germany  16,439  1.8  2.8  76
Canada  16,098  2.0  4.3  77
Belgium  16,051  2.2  4.2  76
Italy  14,570  2.5  9.5  77
Australia  13,095  1.6  7.0  77
United Kingdom  12,585  2.3  5.8  75
New  Zealand  10,643  1.0  10.3  76
Singaporm  10,294  4.9  1.9  74
Hong Kong  9,820  5.8  7.5  78
Spain  8,752  3.3  8.9  77
Korea  4,259  6.8  5.6  70
Malaysia  2,465  3.6  1.7  71
South Africa  2,198  -1.0  14.4  63
Brazil  2,073  2.1  327.6  66
Mexico  1,801  1.0  66.5  70
Turkey  1,375  3.1  44.7  67
Jordan  1,372  -2.1  1.6  69
Thailand  1,362  7.0  3.7  69
Zimbabwe  630  1.7  12.5  60
India  375  3.3  8.2  60
Pakistan  359  3.9  7.0  59
GDP/CAP is the real GDP per capita in US$ in 199  1.  Growth  rate is the average annual growth rate in GDP/CAP
for the period 1980-9  1. Average annual inflation is given  for the period 1980-9  1. Life expectancy at birth is for
year  1991.
27Table  2.  Stock Market  Development Indicators
IMCAP/GDP  1TVT/GDP  'TOR  INST  INDEX I  INDEX  2
Hong Kong  1.261  0.511  0.41  0.731
Japan  0.981  0.531  0.51  0.671
Germany  0.241  0.291  1.23  0.591
United Kingdom  0.86[  0.351  0.39  0.531
Unired States  0.611  0.361  0.58  0.521
Singapore  0.951  0.311  0.31  0.521
Swirzerland  0.751  0.311  0.39  0.491
South Africa  1.351  0.071  0.05  0.491
Malaysia  |  0.881  0.16!  0.161  1.61  0.401  -0.07
Korea  0.221  0.171  0.691  1.49  0.361  -0.21
Thailand  0.211  0.181  0.67  1.351  0.35i  -0.22
Netherlands  0.461  0.191  0.391  0;351
Australia  0.491  0.151  0.30!  0.31!
Canada  0.46j  0.131  0.291  0.291
Sweden  1  0.431  0.101  0.25  0.261
Mexico  |  0.101  0.051  0.691  1.57  0.28!  -0.63
Jordan  i  0.481  0.071  0.14  1.12  023l  -0.24
India  0.07!  0.041  0.59  1.29  0.231  -0.26
Norway  0.181  0.081  0.42  0.231
Austria  1  0.081  0.051  0.51!  0.22!
Brazil  I  0.111  0.051  0.481  1.48t  0.211  -0.97
France  0.23!  0.081  0.321  0.211
Spain1  0.21!  0.071  0.311  0.201
NewZealand  1  0.381  0.06!  0.16j  0.201
Belgium  0.31!  0.041  0.121  0.151
'Italy  0.151  0.041  0.231  0.141
Finland  0.171  0.041  0.18]  0.1I-i
Zinbabwe  0.10i  0.01|  0.081  0.621  0.06i  -0.71
Pakistan  F  0.041  0.011  0.111  0.861  0.061  -0.20
Turkey  0.05!  0.011  0.081  0.96  0.05  -0.31
_  _  _  _I  I__  __  _  1  _  _  1  ._  __  __
._  _  I  _  _ _  I.  I  I  i_  __  _
MCAP/GDP  is the ratio  of stock  market  capitalization  to GDP.  TVT/GDP  is the total  value  of traded  shares
divided by GDP.  TOR  is the turnover  given  by total value traded divided by market capitalization.  INST is the
aggregate institutional  indicator  given  by the average of insfttional  factors in Table  3. Index I is the average of
MCAP/GDP,  TVT/GDP,  and TOR. Index  2 averages  the indicators in index I and a pricing  indicator  estimated
using a domestic  CAPM  model  for developing  countries. Values are 1980-91  averages.
28Table 3. Institutional  Indicators  - 1992 Figures
2  3  4  5  _  6  7
Regular  Accounting  Quality of  Securities  Restrictions  on  Average
publication  standards  investor  exchange  Dividend  Capital  Entry  Institutional
of p/e yield  protection  commission  repat.  repat.  Indicator
Brazil  I  2  2  1  2  2  2  1.71
Mexico  I  2  2  1  2  2  2  1.71
Malaysia  _  2  2  1  _  2  2  2  1.71
Korea  1  2  2  1  2  2  2  1.71
Thailand  I  I  I  1  2  2  2  1.43
Turkey  I  I  I  1  2  2  ___2  1.43
Pakistani  0  1  1  2  2  2  1.29
India  1  2  2  1  1  1  1  1.29
Jordan  0  1  1  1  2  2  2  1.29
Zimbabwe  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  0.57
xo  Columii (2) O=publishied,  I  =comprehensive  and  publishied  internatiolially_  _  __________
Columns  (3) and  (4), O=poor,  I =adequate,  2=good,  of internationally  acceptable  quality
Column  (5) I-functioning securities  exchange  commission  or similar government  agency,  O=no  agency
Column  (6)  O=restricted,  I=some  restrictions,  2=free  _  ____
Column  (7) average  of columns  (2)-(6)._
A  I  9. 
,All data  are  as  of  end-  1992.  The  table is based  on  the  infor  mation  provided  in tile  IFC's  Facitbook  .Table  4.  Financial Intermediary Development  Indicators  I
IM3/GDP  PRIV/GDP  !BANK/GDP  FINDEX I  FINDEX 2
Hong  Kong  3.64  l
Switzerland  1  2.82  3.011  3.12  2.911  3.12
Japan  3.41  2.131  2.45.  2.771  1.42
Singapore  2.14  1.671  1.88  1.911  0.95
Jordan  2.001  1.131  1.34  1.561  1.34
Malaysia  I  1.87  1-241  1.54  1.561  0.67
Netherlands  l  1.63  1.47!  1.89  1.551  1.89
France  1  1.40  1.67T  1.91.  1.531  0.77
Germany  i  1.30  1.721  2.07  1.51  1.19
Austria  1.661  1.34T  2.26  1.50|  2.26
United Kingdom  1.311  1.622!  1.62  1.471  0.92
United  States  1.32  1.41  0.96  1.37!  0.67
Spain  1.371  1.27!  1.80.  1.321  0.70
Finland  1.02  1.421  1.41  1.22[  0.77
Norway  1  1.201  1.161  1.50  1.181  1.50
Thailand  1  1.261  0.961  1.19!  1.111  0.54
Italy  1  1.481  0.671  1.05:  1.071  0.68
Canada  i  1.261  0.871  0.95  1.07  0.56
Australia  j  1.10  0.891  1.01  0.99  0.80
Sweden  0.971  0.921  137  0.94  0.93
South  Africa  1.061  0.72'  0.76'  0.89  0.76
New Zealand  0.971  0.71  !  0.88'  0.841  0.88
Korea  0.77]  0.88!  0.92  0.831  0.45
Belgium  0.9,2  0.58!  1.14  0.751  1.14
Pakistan  0.791  0.52 1  0.66  0.661  0.24
India  |  0.81l  0.481  0.63!  0.651  0.32
Turkey  1  0.571  0.361  0.49!  0.461  0-25
Zimbabwe  I  0.771  0.14;  0.33  0.467  0.22
Mexico  |  0.42  0.231  0.41  0.321  0.16
Brazil  1  0.31  0.27!  0.45  0.29  0.12
M3/GDP  is the ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP.  PRIV/GDP  is the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP.
BANK/'GDP is the ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets  to GDP. FINDEX I averages M3/GDP and PRIV/GDP.
FINDEX 2 averages BANK GDP, private non-bank assets to GDP, and assets of private insurance and pension companies
to GDP. The last two terms are omirted when not available. Values  are 1980-91 avera2es.
30Table 5. Avcrage Firin Size
(in millions of'  US$)
SMALL  MEDIUM  LARGE  VERY LARGE
Sweden  192,704.24  518,652.29  1,178,085.02  3,094,530.22
Japan  116,233.63  256,922.34  556,993.49  4,160,906.34
hlily  85,289.56  215,579.12  697,712.97  4,476,866.60
Korea  63,000.00  121,000.00  178,000.00  527,000.00
Finlanid  69,528.45  257,052.99  682,229.69  1,848,150.08
Spain  38,505.10  107,061.40  234,045.83  965,832.66
India  28,300.00  57,200.00  89,800.00  286,000.00
Norway  19,787.63  65,376.93  202,275.11  946,660.13
France  19,730.74  74,938.50  284,118.03  2,502,374.75
Switzerland  18,731.98  76,265.54  214,584.49  2,146,238.60
New Zealand  17,932.45  55,886.32  126,670.89  648,211.76
Germany  16,899.23  77,578.54  266,325.13  2,779,747.45
Netherluaids  14,595.95  69,811.69  216,311.03  1,958,972.95
I loing  Koiig  13,549.41  39,890.70  83,067.67  607,074,62
United  States  13,483.58  50,750.71  137,437.22  1,220,275.64
Austria  11,883.93  40,866.86  149,432.11  1,039,346.90
Brazil  9,900.00  17,800.00  30,800.00  93,900.00
United Kingdomi  9,548.49  35,739.16  110,966.45  1,180,701.29
rurkey  7,800.00  17,600.00  29,200.00  81,400.00
Singapore  7,541.20  26,065.43  68,452.41  206,160.13
South Africa  6,530.17  40,299.70  140,792.68  827,443.38
Mexico  5,900.00  18,000.00  44,300.00  210,600.00
Zimbabwe  5,900.00  11,600.00  21,000.00  64,400.00
Pakistan  5,700.00  11,800.00  17,600.00  76,500.00
Cal,,alal  5,519.0)6  32,984.18  106,908.67  629,525.98
Malaysia  4,886.31  14,091.94  29,770.33  148,555.45
Jordan  4,100.00  9,600.00  17,300.00  177,800.00
Belgium  4,092.03  31,236.36  144,011.40  1,242,864.60
Australia  2,961.29  18,058.71  59,656.91  509,707.27
Thailand  2,532.44  7,744.35  16,840.92  65,729.57
The  values  are  average  total assets,  for each  quartile  of firns classified  by total assets,  over  the country's  sample  period.Table 6. Firm  Characteristics by Country
LTDTE  STDTE  'InlE  NFATA  DEPTA  DIVTA  PROFIT  NSNFA  NDTS  TA/GDP
Australia  0.563  0.653  1.248  0.385  0.033  0.025  0.064  4.509  -0.008  0.0024
Austria  1.201  1.495  2.69,  0.293  0.051  0._17  0.0._  3.477  0.012  o0  .0i46
Belgiumn  0.764  1.259  2.023  0.22  1  0.039  0.022  0.092  6.153  0.030  0.0087
Brazil  0.139  0.421  0.560  0.640  0.002  0.057  1.166  0.017  0.0033
Canada  0.990  0.539  1.600  0.479  0.045  0.014  0.064  3.674  -0.031  0.0018
Swikzerland  0 878  0.872  1.750  0.304  0.043  0.016  0.073  5.463  -0.081  0.0090
Gmermay  1.47').  1.188  2.7,32  0321  0.070  0.013  0.087  7.209'  0.0.07  0.0018
.Spalii  _  _  1.08_.  1.6319  2.7416  0.446  0.04)  0.016  0.095  3.613  0.017  0.0070
Finland  3.094  1.856  4.920  0.341  0.042  0.007  0.077  3.977  0.010  0.0154
France  1.417  2.108  3.613  0.234  0.043  0.014  0.094  7.727  0.010  0.0019
United  Kingdom  0.387  1.065  1.480  0.336  0.032  0.025  0.108  6.447  0.009  0.0010
I long Kong  0.309  0.967  1.322  0.344  0.017  0.057  0.121  6.676  0.020  0.0094
India  0.763  1.937  2.700  0.405  0.038  0.019  0.132  5.614  0.027  0.0006
I a  1y_  _  _  . _  _  1.114  3,954  _  3.068  0.327  0.041  0,014  0.080  3.287  0.0000  0.0049
Jordanil  0.266  0.915  I .181  0.459  _  ___0.033  0.073  2.979  _  _  0.0089
Japa_  (0.9.1  2.726  3.688  0_245  0.026  O  i0.007  0.067  8.373  -0.016  0,1N08
r  Korea  1,057  2.390  3.662  0.371  0.053  0.008  0.100  4.340  0.002  0.0023
Mexico  0.375  0.442  0.817  0.579  0.076  1.445  0.013  0.0021
Malaysia  0.284  0.639  0.935  0.405  0.021  0.026  0.087  3.264  0.010  0.0032
Nctherlands  0.710  1.297  2.156  0.334  0.043  0.020  0.094  7.500  0.018  0.0(89
Norway  3.495  1.880  5.375  0.433  0.049  0.009  0.092  2.703  -0.005  0.0143
NewZealand  0.752  0.776  1.527  0.401  0.030  0.025  0.106  5.067  0.022  0-0224
Pakistan  0.595  2.358  2.953  0.384  0.038  0.028  0.115  11.155  0.055  0.0012
Singapore  0.491  0.718  1.232  0.363  0.022  0.018  0.077  5.152  -0.004  0.0104
Sweden  2.879  2.321  5.552  0.342  0.036  0.01i  0.100  4.398  0.021  0.0146
Thailiand1  _  . _0_  __  _1).51R8  _  _  1.7(i'9  2.215  .31(1 __  _O.(.1i3  0.(29  0.129  5.710  ()(07  0(H)07
Turkey  0.485  1.511  1.996  0.414  0.068  0.239  4.240  0.01i  0.0011
United Slates  I.054  0.679  1.791  0.370  0.045  0.016  0.091  6.943  -0.015  0.0003
South  Africa  0.597  0.518 _1.115  0.535  0.013  0.062  0.206  4.036  0.066  0.0120
Zimbabwe  0.187  0.615  0.801  0.033  0.028  0.1311  0.033  0.0063
LTDITE is the  book value of long term  debt  divided by book value of equity.  STD/TE and  TD/T  are  the  book value  of short  tern and  total debt  divided by book value  of equity.  NAFTA is thc net fixed assets
divided by total as!;cts.  DEPTA is depreciation  divided by total assets.  DIVrA  is the dividends  divided by total assets.  PROFIT  is the Income  before  Interest  and taxes  divided by total assets.  NSNFA is the ne
sales  divided by net fixed assets.  NDTS is the non-debt  tax  shield which is earnings  before  taxes  minus  the ratio of corporatc  taxes  paid to corporate  tax rate,  deflated  by total assets.  TA/GDP is total assets
divided by the  GDP of the country.  The value  of each  item is calculated  as  the average  of all firms for each  country's  sample  period.Table  7. Correlations of Leverage and Financial Indicators
STDTrE  TDTE  MCAP/CJDP  TVT/CuDP  TOR  INDFX  I  M3/GDP  BIANKIGDP FINDEX  I  H NDEX  2  GDP/CAP
LTDTE-  0.531  0.890  -0.191  -0.094  0.054  -0.120  -0.106  0.194  0.066  0.162  0.471
0.000  0.000  0.002  0.141  0.398  0.060  0.088  0.002  0.294  0.0)0  0.000
STDTI3  ___  0.846  -0.261  -0.007  0.076  -0.106  0.008  0.130  0.066  -0.036  0.087
0.000  0.000  0.910  0.231  0.097  0.902  0  038  0.295  0.571  0.153
TDlE  ____  ~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~-0.246  -0 051  0.079  _  -0.117  -0.065  0.191  0.074  0.083  0.3'14
0.000  0.421  0.215  0.066  0.293  0.002  0.239  0.188  0.000
MCAP/GDP  0.664  0.05  1  0.782  0.555  0.365  0000.268  0.228
0.000  0.277  0.000  0.000  0._000  0.000  a.000  0.000
'rVT/GD)P  ______0.523  0.894  0.592  0.470  0.594  0.311I  0.334
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
lOllk  0.648  0.178  0,249  0.270  029  0-19  8
0.000  0.000  0.000)  0.000  0.000  0.000
INDIEX,  ______  _____  ____________  ___________0.-530  -0.46'2  -0.5  2 9  - 0.-3  15  0.29-2
0.000  0.000  0.000  0a000  0.000
M3/GDp______  _______  ___  _____  0.816  0.951  0.707  0.451
_________  ________  ______  _____  ____  __________  ~~~~~~~~~~~0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
l1ANKJGIW____  P__  0.905  0.868  0.645
_______  ____________  _______  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.000  0.000  0.000
FINDEX  1  _____  _________  ____  0.742  0.631
_____  ~~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.000  0 000
I:IDEX  2  __  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _0.578
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _  _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _  0.0  00.0  0
P-values  are  given in italics. Variable  definitionis  arc as  given in Tables  1,  2, 4, and 7.__________________Table  8. Dctermiiiants  of Capital Structure
Firti  Financial  Stock  Macro  Tax  | Time  Country  Adjusted  | Number  of
Characteristics  Variable  Market  Factors  Variables  Dummnies  Dummies  R2  Observations
Indicator
All countries
~Sld/tc  33.19***  3.43  .22  2.39*  . 1.1 I  1  5.9 8 *  .8(  2 1i
ltd/te  3.25***  4.18**  2.40  1.84  2.62$  1.25  11.42**  .79  211
td/te  3.07***  8.09***  .99  2.73*  2.67*  .99  13.19***  .80  211
F-test  are reported  testinig  lhe  joint hypotliesis  that specilied  variable  coefficients  are equal  to  zero. Coefficients  are  obtainied  by regressinig  STD/'T'E,  LTD/TE,
and  TD/TE on firm  characteristics  (NIFATA,  PROFIT,  NSNFA,  NDTS,  DIVTA,  TA/GDP),  macro  factors  (GROWTII,  INFL),  tax  variables,  stock market
development indicator (index 1), financial intermediary variable (bank/gdp), time and countr-y  dummy variables.  *, +,  and  indicate significance levels of
10, 5, and I percent respectively.lable  9. Capital  Structure  aMiil  Stock  Miarkel  Development-  D)cveloped  and Developing  Stock  Markes
I ncap/gdp  tvtIgdp  lor  Index  I  index  2
Countries  will) developed  stock  market 
m3/gdp  -.23  -.36  -. 04  -.27  -.14
sid/tc  bank/gdp  -.07  -.48  -.06  -.24  -.16
findexl  -. 04  -.47  -. 07  -.23  -.16
findcx  2  -.06  -.48  -. 07  -.23  -.17
m3/gdp  -.43  -.62'  -.34'  -.78"  -.43
lidhe  bank/gdp  -.50'  -.81"  -.37*  -.90*0*  -.53'
findex I  -.54'  -.82"  -.37'  -.94*"  -.52'
findex  2  -. 49'  -.80"0  -.37'  -.90**  -.530
m3/gdp  -.49  -.93'  -.35  -.95'  -.52
id/lc  bank/gdp  -.47  -1.18'"  -.38  -1.040'  -.60
findex I  -.42  -1.21"  -.40  -1.07"#  -.62
lilidex  2  -.44  -1.15"  _  -.38  -1.02*  -.61
Countries  with developing  slock  markcts
m3/gdp  .10  .97  .06  .20  .74"'
sid/te  bank/gdp  .16  .84  .05  .17  .69" '
lijidex  I  .15  .93  .07  .22  .74"'
_  findex  2  29  1.21  .08  .31  .76"'
m3/gdp  1.06  2.26  .03  .50  .99"'
ltd/te  bank/gdp  1.04  1.94  -.01  .39  .90"
limlex  I  1L,  2.1t0  .02  .47  .972*'
findex  2  1.27  2.52  .04  .59  .9'*
m3/gdp  1.4.0  3.61  .16  .93  1.80"'
td/te  bank/gdp  139  3.09  .09  .76  1.65"'
rindex I  139  3.39  .16  .90  1.7"'
findex  2  1.79  4.06  .18  1.11  1.81"'
Coefficient  values  are  frto,,  regressions  of STrD/  E,  LIl  DrrE, and  TD(TltI  on liren  characteristics  (NFATA, PROFIT,  NSNFA,  NDTS,  DIVTA,  T1A/GDP),  macso  factors  (GROWlTl,  INIS), tax
variables,  stock  imiket variables,  financial  iiterimiediary  variables,  timie  and  country  dummy  variables.  lThe  split  between  developed  nid developing  stock  markets  Is  determilned  based  on  index  I.
Index  2  includes  CAPM  mis-pricing  in(licator  when  available.  rach regression  includes  only  die  indicated  stock  market  and  financial  iiternediary variables.',  ",  and  "'  indicate  significancc
levels  of 10,  5,  and  I percent  respectively.lFllMe 111.  Capitil  Structure  stikd  Stock  lj  hIe  l)t vlDv  liopment  - D)eveloped  anid Developiug  Stock  Markets,  Latrge vs. Small  nlrmns
Small  flirmis  Large  Fimis
_ncap/gdp  i idexl  iidex  2  . mcap/gdp  lidexl  h[idex  2
Couluriiies  wili  developed  stock  nmarkets 
m3/gdp  -.32  -.64  -. 41  -.39  -.59  -.44
std/te  bank/gdp  -.43  -.75  -.51  -.14  -.28  -.27
findex  i  -.47  -.74  -.53  -.25  -.39  -.31
findex  2  -.44  -.79'  -.56  -.17  -.26  -.26
m3/gdp  -.68  -1.28  -.84  -.39"  -.29  -.03
lid/ic  hank/gdp  -. 85  -1.72  -1.19  -.39"'  -.28  -.03
finidex  I  -1.22  -1.92'  -1.25  -.45"  -.31  -.04
flitlex 2  -.85  -1.67  -1.15  -.39"  *.28  -.03
m3/gdp  -. 71  -2.17  -1.29  -.68  -.83  -.48
td/te  bank/gdp  -1.03  -2.67'  -1.71  -.62  -.66  -.35
findex I  -1.44  -2.99"  -1.85  -. 71  -.76  -.41
Iindex  2  -1.1)2  -2.63'  -1.71  -.65  -.63  -.34
Counlries  with developing  stock  markets  .
m3/gdp  |1.11  -1.02  -.22  .47  1.64"  |  1.23'*
sid/te  bank/gdp  -1.07  -1.05  -.24  .02  1.49"  1.00"'
findex  I  -1.13  -1.06  -.24  .26  1.58"|  1.18"'
rfindex  2  -1-17  -1.05  -. 21  .74  1.77"  !1.19"'
mn3/gdp  -.34  -. 26  .23  2.85|  3.060'  2.17"*'
lid/te  banklgdp  --34  -.30  .19  1.80  2.70*  1.72"
findex  I  -.39  -.30  .21  2.27  2.88'  2.05"**
findex2  -.43  -.28  .25  3.10"|  3.23"|  2.16"'
m3/gdp  -1.50  -1.26  .00  3.98'  4.92"  |  3.57"'
d/te  bank/gdp  -1.38  -1.31  -.06  12.13  430"  2.77"'
(index  I  -1.52  -1.32  -.04  13.10  4.65"*  3.38"'
findex  2  1-1.57  -1.28  .05  .4.48"  5240"  3.54"*'
Cocieficient  values  are  from  regressions  of STDMrE,  I.TD/;E, and  TD/TE on  firm characteristics  (NFATA,  PROFIT,  NSNFA,  NDTS,  DIVTA,  TA/GDP),  macro  factors  (GROWTII,  INFI.),  tax
variables,  stock  niarket  variables,  flnancial  lntcmiedlairy  varlables,  time  and  counlry  dummy  variables.  1  he  spIlt  between  developed  and  developing  slock  markets  Is delermined  based  on index  I.
Indcx2  includes  CAPM  mis-pricing  indicator  when  available.  Small  and  large  flrms  are  the  firms  that  fall into  the  smallest  and  largest  quartiles  classified  by  total  assets  over  each  country's  sample
period.  Each  regression  includes  only  the  indicated  stock  markel  and  rinancial  intermediary  variables.',  ",  and  **  indicate  significanec  levels  of 10,  5,  and  I percent  respectively.I'able  I 1.  I)etermitanants  of Capitial  Structure,  Developed  anrd  Developinig  Stock  Markets,  Large  vs. Small  Firms
Finn  Financial  Stock  Mnrket  Macro  Factors  Tax  Variables  Time  Dummies  Country  Adjusted  Number  of
Characterislics  Variabile  Ind  icaor  Dummiles  R'  Obscrvations
1.
Couitries  wilh developcd  stock  markets
std/te  5.47"'  1.01  .63  .44  3.42"  .77  16.81  .85  114
ltd/te  2.56"  .06  6.59"  1.55  .64  1.69*  4.01*"*  .70  114
td/te  3.21"'  1.95  3.80'  1.64  1.46  1.37  8.20"*  .82  114
Countries  with dvcelopiiig  stock  markets
std/te  1.22  4.91''  .10  3.53"  2.24'  .37  7.05"'  .72  97
tlJd/te  ~  3.46"'  5.030*  .21  6.40"'  1.14  1.12  19.50"''  .85  97
Id/te  2.57"*  6.52'"'  .37  7.10'''  2.03  .74  15.88'''  .81  97
11.
Large  Firms  -Countries  with developed  stock  markets
std/te  6.58"'  2.71'  .43  1.67  2.51'  2.10"  7  61"'  .84  114
lidlte  1.69  .66  1.20  3.31"  .37  2.41"  4.66"*  .74  I!4
Id/tc  3.774"  4.55*"  1.32  3.17"1  1.84  2.22"  7.26**  .82  114
latge  IFinny  -Countirles  wilh developing  stock nan  kels
std/te  4.06"'|  11.35"'  |  3.92"  6.80*"  .34  1.97**  7.63"'  .77  97
ltd/te  5.95*"'  10.05"'  |  3.45'  6.22"'  .90  3.11**  12.09"'  .75  97
Id/ic  3.99"'  1565"''  4.35"*  7.43'''  .51  2.90"'  10.28"'  .73  97
Small  Firms  -Countries  with developed  stock  markets
std/te  14.82"'  11.34  2.60'  2.95'  7.98"'  .42  9.22"'  .75  114
ltd/te  12.17''  |.11  12.55'  .32  2.23'  1.40  1.71'  .40  114
td/te  |12.28'  .87  3.27'  .26  2.82'  1.19  2.130"  SI  114
Small  Firms  -Countries  with developing  stock  mnaikets
std/te  2.35''  .11  J  1.96  .35  .14  1.24  3.68"'  71  93
ltd/te  1.58  1.16  1.04  54  .13  .54  5.22"'  .57  93
Id/Ie  .64  1.20  1.52  .61  .01  .75  5.48"'  .64  93
IAtN are  reported  lestinig  the  joitii ltypotltcsis  that  specilled  variaible  coemieletis  arc  ciltial  to  zero.  Coefliclinis  sic  obtainied  by  regressing  STFDf1'r,  LTlIYIF, and  lIri'rF  on  firm characicristics
(NFATA,  PROFIT,  NSNIA,  NDTIS,  D)lViA,  TA/GI)I'),  micro faclors  ((ROWTII,  INFL),  tax  variables,  stock  niarket  development  liidicitlor  (index  1),  financial  literimiediary  variable  (bank/gill)).
itime  and  country  dummny  variables.  'Ihe split  between  developed  and  developing  stock  niarkets  is determined  based  on lidexl.  Siaiill  anm  large  firns are  Ihe  tinis thal fall Iito tile  smallest  amnd
largest  quartiles  classified  by  total  assets  over  each  country's  sample  period.  '  "  and  '"  indicate  significance  levels  of 10,  5,  and  I percent  respectively.Figure 1
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Index  I  Index IAppendix Table 1.  Number of Firms and Sample  Period
Countrv  No.of Firms  Time Period
Australia  401  1983-93
Austria  44  1983-93
Belgium  89  1983-94
Brazil  100  1985-91
Canada  494  1983-93
Switzerland  150  1983-93
Germany  359  1983-93
Spain  116  1983-93
Finland  55  1983-93
France  544  1983-93
United Kingdom  1275  1983-93
Hong Kong  173  1983-93
India  100  1980-90
Italy  81  1983-93
Jordan  38  1980-90
Japan  1104  1983-93
Korea  100  1980-90
Mexico  100  1984-91
Malaysia  143  1983-93
Netherlands  165  1983-93
Norway  52  1983-93
New Zealand  41  1983-93
Palistan  100  1980-88
Singapore  213  1983-93
Sweden  68  1983-93
Thailand  137  1983-93
Turkey  45  1982-90
United States  3247  1983-93
South Africa  67  1983-93
Zimbabwe  48  1980-88
40AppendixTinble  2. Tsix Advantatge  of_lDebt  ivitim_Rlespcct  to_Di)vidend  a,ndalCapilaI nioiii
COUJNTR'Y  --  BRAZIL  ___  INDIA  KOIREA  MALAYSIA  MEXICO
YEAR  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  - 990  -~1980  __  990
corporate  tax  rate  0.400  0.400  0.591  0.525  0.420  0.375  0.500  0.390  0.420  0.360
local-taxes:  0.000  0.050  0.000  0.000  0.032  0.028  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
corporate  tax  rate  on distributed  profits  0.400  0.400  0.59  1  0.525  0.420  0.375  0.500  0.390  0.420  0.360
high  personal  tax  rate  ____  0.550  0.400  0.720  0.525  0.744  0.600  0.550  0.400  0.550  0.350
local  taxes:  0.000  0.050  0.000  0.000  0.056  0.045  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
personal  capital  gains  tax  0.000  0.250  0.720  0.525  0.744  0.600  0.000  0.000  0.000,  0.000
rate  oni  interest  income  ____  0.550  0.250  0.720  0.525  0.744  0.600  0.550  0.400  0.550  0.2  10
rate  on dividend  income  0.550  0.080  0.720  0.525  0.744  0.600  0.400  0.350  0.550  0.350
rebate  on dividends  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.150  0.120  0.400  0.350  0.000  0.000
net interest  income  per  $1  0.450  0.750  01.280  0.475  0.256  0.400  0.450  0.600  0.450  0.790
net  capital  gain per  $1  0.600  __0.450  0.114  0.226  0.148  0.250  ___0.500  0.610  0.580  __  0.640
niet  dividends  per  $1  ___  0.270  0.552  0.114  0.226  0.235  0.325  0.500  0.610  0.261  0.4  16
tax  disadvanitage:  dividenids  0.400  0.264  0.591  0.525  0.080  0.188  -0.111  -0.017  0.420  0.473
tax  disadvantage:  capital  gainis  _-0.333  040  0.591  0.525  0.420  0.375  -0.111  -0.0  17  -0.289  0.190
COUN'I'RY  ____  AKISTIAN___  TIIAILANI)  TruRKEY  ____  ZIMBJAIIWE___  AUSTR'IALIA  __
YEAR  1981  1990  1980  1990  1982  1990  - 1980  1990  1980  1990
corporate  tax  rate  ____  0.578  0.550  0.300  0.300  0.400  0.492  0.495  0.500  0.460  0.390
local  taxes:  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  _  0.000
corporate  tax  rate  on distributed  profits  0.578  0.550  0.300  0.300  0.400  0.492  0.495  0.500  0.460  0.390
high  personal  tax rate  0.660  0.495  0.650  0.550  0.650  0.500  0.495  0.600  0.611  0.470
local  taxes:  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
personal  capital  gains  tax  ____  0.000  0.495  0.000  0.000  0.650  0.000  0.000  0.300  0.000  0.470
rate  on interest  income  0.660  0.495  0.650  0.150  0.650  0.500  _  0.495  0.600  0.611  0.470
anlem  oi (livi(lcflcI  incomec  0.660  0.495  0.650  0.150  0,650  0.500  0.200  0.20(1  0.611  0.470
irebate  on  dividenids  0.W(1  (1.000  0.(Ot)  (ODOt  0.330  0.000  0.000  t).OOt)  0.000  0.000
net interest  income  per  $1  0.340  0.505  0.350,  0.850  0.350  0.500  0.505  0.400  0.389  0.530
net  capital  gain  per  $1  0.423  0.227  0.700  0.700  0.2  i10  0.508  0.505  0-.350  0.540  0.323
net dividends  per  $1  ___  ___  0.144  0.227  0.245  -0.595  0.408Ol  0-.  2  54  0.404  _  _0.40t)  021  .2
tax  disadivantage:  dividends  0.57-8  0.550  0.300  0.300  -0.166  0.492  0.200  QOOt  0.460  _0.  390Q
itax  disadvant(age:  capital  gains  -023  0.550  100  016  040  -. 1  0.0  0.1251  -0.3871  0.390Appeindix  Table 2 cont(inued.  Tax Advanitage  of Debt wvith_  Respect to_Dividendi  and(  Capital Gainis
COUNTFRY  -~AUSTIRIA  BELGIUM  CANADA  -- FINLAND)  FRANCE
YEAR  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  __  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990
corporate  tax  rate  0.550  0.300  0.480  0.4  10  0.360  0.288  ___0.430  0.250  _  0.500  0.370
local  taxes:  ______0.150  0.135  0.000  0.000  0.140  0.155  0.160  __0.1  70  0.000  0.000
corporate  tax  rate  on distribuited  profits  0.275  0.300  0.480  0.410  0.360  __0.-288  0--.  172  0.250  -0.500  0.420
hiighi  persoialI  tax rate_  __  0.595  0.500  0.763  -0.550  0.430  0.305 --  0.5.10  0.43-0  0.600  0.568
local taxes:  _____0.000  0.000  ___  .60  0.100  _  0.226 ___0.162  0.160  0.186  0.000  _  0.000
personiili  capital  gains  (ax  -~  0.000  0.000  0.175  _  0.165  0.022  ___0.203  0.5  10  0.430  0.600  0.160
r'ate  on initerest  inicom-e  000  050  0.763  0.550  0.430  0.305 __0.000  0.100  0.600  0.568
rate  oi dlividend(  inicomie  0.595  0.500  0.763  0.550  0.323  0.330  0.5  10  0.430  0.600  (0.568
rebate  oni  dividends  _____0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.0(1(1__  0.500  0.500
net_interest  income  pL'r  $1  1.000  ~~0.50(1  (0.237  0.450  0.570()  0.695.  I  L00(1  0.-900  0.400  0.432
net_capital  gain  per  $1  ___  0.450  0.700  0.429  0.493  0.626  0.567  0.279  0.428  0.200  ___0.529
niet  dividends  per $1  ___  0.294  0.350  0.123  ___0.266  0.434  0.477  0.406  0.428  0.450  0.541
tax  disadvantage:  dividends  __0.706  0.300  ___0.480  0.410  0.239  0.3  14  0.594  0.525  -0.125  - -0.251
tax  disadatge  aialgis0.550  -0.400  ..0. 812f  -0.095  -0.099  0.184  0.72  1  0.525  __0.500  -0.225
COUN__R  GERMANY  IIONG  KONG  IT'ALY  ____JAPIAN  __  NEprIERlLANI)S
YEAR  -~1980~  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990  - 1980  1990
corporate  (ax rate  0.560  0.500  0.170  0.165  0.250  0.360  0,400  0.375  0.480  0.400
local  taxes:  0.200  0.250  0.000  ~0.000  0.1J50  ~0.  162 ---. 19-1  -0-.187  _0.00-0  _0.00
corporate_tax  rate  oni  distribuited  profits  0.360  0.360  ___0.170  0.165  0.250  0.360  0.300  0.375  0.480  0.400
high personal  tax  rate  0.560  0.530  0.150  0.150  0.720  0.500  0.750  0.500  0.720  0.600
local  taxes:  0,050  0.048  0.0(10  0.00(1  0.150  0.162  0.05(1  0.150  0.000  0.000
personal  capital  gains  tax  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 _  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.260  0.200  0.200
rale on initerest_incomie  - _  -6  050  0.000  0.000 - 0.720-  0.5(0  - 0.750  0.200 -- 0.720 - 0.600
rate  on dividend  incomne  ___0.560  0.530  0.000  0.000  0.720  0.500  0.750  0.200  0.720  0.600
rebate  on dividends  ___0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.333  0.563  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
_net  interest  income  per  $1  0.440  0.470  1.000  1.000  0.280  0.500  0.250  0.800  0.280  0.400
net  capital  gain  per  $1  0.440  0.500  0.830  0.835  0.750  0.640  0.600  0.463  0.416  0.480
net  dividends  per  $1  0.282  0.301  0.830  0.835  0.460  0.680  0.175  0.500  0.  146  0.240
tax  disadvantage:  dividends_  0.360  0.3601  0.170  0.165  -0.642  -0.3601  0.300  -0.375  0.480  0.400
ilax  disaidvantiage:  capilal  gains  I  0.0001  -0,06_4j  0.,170  066  -1.6791  -0.2801  -1.4001  0.4221  -0.4861  -0.2001Append(ix  Table 2 cointiniedI.  Tax Advaintage  of Debt withi  Respect to Dividend.  and Capital Gains  _____
COUN  -kIII-t  NEW  ZEALAND  NORWAY  __  SINGAPORE  &9)UTII  AFRIICA  SPA-IN-
YEAR  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990
corporate  tax  rate  ________0.450  0.380  0.278  0.278  0.400  0.3  10  0.473  0.545  0.330  0.350
local  taxes:  _____  0.000  0.000  0.230  0.230  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.0  15
corporate  tax  rate  oni  distributed  profits  ___0.450  0.380  0.278  0.278  0.400  0.3  10  0.473  0.545  0.330  0.350
hiighi  personal  tax rate  0.600  0.330  0.480  0.184  0.550  0.330  0.500  0.440  0.655  0.560
local  taxes:  ___  _____0.000  0.000  0.230  0.250  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  __0.000
personal  capital  gains  tax  ______  0.000  0.000  0.500  _  0.400  0.000  0.000  _  0.000  0.000  0.655  0.560
ra(e  oni  initerest  inicomei  0.600  0.330  0.480  0.184  0.550  0.330  _  0.500  0.440  0.655  0.560
rate  oni  dividenid  inicomie  0.600  0.330  0.480  0.184  0.550  0.330  0.167  _  0.150  0.655  0.560
rebate  oni  dividenids  _____  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  _  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.100
net interest  i-icnicm  per  $1  0.400  0.670  0.520  0.8  16  0.450  0.670  0.500  0.560  0.345  0.440
net  capital  gain  per  $l  0.550  0.620 ___U61  0.433  0.270  0.462  0.528  0.455  0.231  0.286
net_dividends  per  $1  0.220  0.415  0.375  0.589  0.270  0.462  0.440  0.387  0.231  0.351
tax disadvantlage:  dividend(s  - -0.450  - 0.380  0.278  0.278  0.400  0.3  10  ___0.121  0.309  _  0.330  0.202
tax  disadvantage:  capital  gainis  -0.375  0.075  0.306  0.469  0.400  0.3  10  -0.055  0.188  0.330  0.350
COUNTRY-  - SWEIDEN  --  SWITZERLAND.-  UNfTIA)  KINGDOMI UNITED  STATES  - .-  .
YEAR  - 1980  1990  -~1980  1990  1980  1990~  1980  1990
corporatc  tax  rate  __  ____  0.400  0.300  0.098  0.098  0.520  0.350  - 0.460  0.340  _-
local  taxes:  0.280  0.000  _  0.3  14  ___  .000  0.000  0.120  0.120  ____
corporate  tax rate  oii  distribuited  profits  0.400  0.300  0.098  0.098  0.520  0.350  0.460  0.340  ___
hiighi  per-sonial  tax  rate  0.580  0.510  0.115  -0.1  IS  600  0.400  0.700  0.330
local taxes:  __________  0.280  0.000  0___(.145  1)000  0.000  0.1201-0.120  ____
personal  capital  gainis  tax  0.580  0.300  0.000  ___0.000  -0.300  0.400 --- 0.280  ___0.330
rate  ori  interest  inicome  ____  0.580  0.300  0.1l  I  0.115  0.600  0.400  0.700  0.330
rate  ond(ivideid  income  __0.580  0.300  0.115  _  0.115  0.600  0.400  0.700  ___0.330  __
rebate  oni  dividenids  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.429  0.333  0.000  0.000
net  inter-est  income  per  $1  0.420  0.700  0.885  0.885  0.400  0.600  0.300  0.670
n-et  capit-ai  gain per $1 _--  - --  0.51  040  -__  .0  .0  .3  0.39  0  039  -0.442  - .-  .
oict  dlividlends  pcr-$l  _  0.252  0.490  0.798  0.798  0.398  01.607  __0.162  0.442____
tax  disadvantage:  dividends  --  0.400  0.300  0.098  0.098  0.006  -0.01  I  0.460,  0.340  ___
tax  disadlvantage:  capital  gains  ___0.400  0.300  -0.0  19  -0.0  19  0.160  0.350  -0.296[7  0.340  ___  _
Ilihe  tax rates  usc(d  are  thie  statuitory  onces.  D)ata  atie  obtalined  f-oin  variiouis  editionis  of Coopers  & Lybrand,  linterniatioittal'rax  Summartinies.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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